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We have used the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade to simulate the economic 
effects of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations completed in 1993-94 on the 
major industrialized and developing countries/regions.  We estimate that the Uruguay Round 
negotiations increased global economic welfare by $73.0 billion.  The developed countries overall 
have an estimated welfare gain of $53.8 billion, and the developing countries an estimated 
welfare increase of $19.2 billion.   
 
We have also simulated the effects of assumed 33 percent reductions in trade barriers in the 
ongoing Doha Development Round.  There is an estimated increase in global welfare of $574.0 
billion.  There is a global welfare decline of $3.1 billion from agricultural liberalization due 
primarily to the assumed reductions in export subsidies.  There are global welfare gains of $163.4 
billion from reductions in manufactures tariffs and $413.7 billion from reductions in services 
barriers.  All of the countries/regions covered in the Michigan Model show overall welfare 
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  In this chapter, we analyze the trade liberalization provisions in the Uruguay Round and 
the prospective trade liberalization in the ongoing Doha Development Round, using the Michigan 
Model of World Production and Trade.  The Michigan Model is a computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) simulation model designed to assess the potential economic effects of trade 
liberalization. We  present an overview of the Michigan Model in Section II, and the 
computational results of the analysis of the trade negotiations in the Uruguay Round and the 
Doha Development Round in Sections III and IV.  Conclusions and implications are discussed in 
Section V.  
 
II. Overview of the Michigan CGE Model 
The distinguishing feature of the Michigan Model is that it incorporates some aspects of 
the New Trade Theory, including increasing returns to scale, monopolistic competition, and product 
heterogeneity.  A complete description of the formal structure and equations of the model can be 
found on line at www.spp.umich.edu/rsie/model/. 
  The version of the model that we will use consists of 20 countries/regions (plus rest-of-
world) and 18 production sectors.  The country/region and sectoral coverage are indicated in the 
tables noted below.  Agriculture is modeled as perfectly competitive and all other sectors as 
monopolistically competitive with free entry and exit of firms.  The model is implemented using 
GEMPACK software, as described in Harrison and Pearson (1996).   2
Needless to say, the data needs of the Michigan model are immense. The main data 
source is “The GTAP-4 Database” of the Purdue University Center for Global Trade Analysis 
Project (McDougall et al., 1998).   The reference year for this database is 1995. We have 
extracted the following data, aggregated to our sectors and regions, from this source: 
1.  Bilateral trade flows among 20 countries/regions, decomposed into 18 sectors.  Trade 
with the rest-of-world (ROW) is included to close the model. 
1.  Input-output tables for the 20 countries/regions, excluding ROW 
2.  Components of final demand along with sectoral contributions for the 20 
countries/regions, excluding ROW  
3.  Gross value of output and value added at the sectoral level for the 20 countries/regions, 
excluding ROW 
4.  Bilateral import tariffs by sector among the 20 countries/regions 
5.  Elasticity of substitution between varieties in demand 
6.  Bilateral export-tariff equivalents among the 20 countries/regions, decomposed into 18 
sectors 
  The monopolistically competitive market structure in the nonagricultural sectors of the 
model imposes an additional data requirement of the number of firms at the sectoral level. These 
data have been drawn from the United Nations, International Yearbook of Industrial Statistics, 
1998.
1  We also need estimates of sectoral employment for the countries/regions of the model.  
These data come from:  UNIDO, 1995, International Yearbook of Industrial Statistics, and the 
World Bank, 1997,  World Development Report. The employment data have been aggregated 
according to our sectoral/regional aggregation to obtain sectoral estimates of workers employed 
in manufactures.  The World Development Report was used to obtain data for the other sectors. 
  We have projected the GTAP-4 1995 database to the year 2005 by extrapolating the labor 
availability in different countries/regions by an average weighted growth rate of 1.2 per cent per 
annum.  This figure was computed from the growth-rate forecasts for the period 1997-2010 
                                                 
1 It should be noted that the above source does not provide number-of-firms data for all countries. We have   3
provided for various countries in Table 2.3 of the World Bank’s 1999  World Development 
Indicators.  All other major variables have been projected, using an average weighted growth rate 
of GDP of 2.5 per cent per annum, for all of the countries/regions of our model during the period 
1990-1997, as per Table 11 of the 1989/99 World Development Report.
2 
III. Computational Scenarios of Uruguay Round Liberalization 
  The projected database provides us with an approximate picture of what the world could 
be expected to look like in 2005 if the Uruguay Round (UR) negotiations had not occurred.  The 
UR reductions in trade barriers were implemented beginning in 1995 and will be completed by 
2005.  Accordingly, we have analyzed the impact of the UR-induced changes that are expected to 
occur over the course of the 10-year implementation period as a consequence of the negotiated 
reductions in tariffs and NTBs.
3  The scaled-up database for 2005 is then readjusted to mimic the 
world as it might look in the post-UR implementation.  In Section IV following, we will report on 
some liberalization scenarios for the ongoing WTO (Doha) negotiating round, involving possible 
reductions in tariffs on agricultural products and manufactures and reductions of barriers to 
services trade. 
  In this section, we report on the following three scenarios:
4 
                                                                                                                                                 
used the number-of-firms data for similar countries in these cases.  
2 See Hertel and Martin (1999) and Hertel (2000) for a more elaborate and detailed procedure for 
calculating year 2005 projections.  See also our discussion below on the 2005 projections. 
3 It should be noted that we are not considering the effects of the Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) and the other agreements on rules and procedures that were encompassed in the 
Uruguay Round negotiations. 
4 Agricultural liberalization in the Uruguay Round negotiations was presumably to be as follows:  agricultural 
import tariffs were to be reduced by 20 percent for the industrialized countries and by 13 percent for the 
developing countries; agricultural export subsidies were to be reduced by 36 percent for the industrialized 
countries and by 24 percent for the developing countries; and agricultural production subsidies were to be 
reduced by 20 percent for the  industrialized countries and by 14 percent for the developing countries.  
However, as noted in Francois (2001b, p. 11):  “Basically, in agriculture, we are in a world that allows scope 
for great policy discretion and uncertainty as a result of the loose commitments made.”  What this means is 
that many countries introduced quantitative restrictions on imports in the form of tariff-rate quotas.  There is 
also evidence of considerable leeway in the choice of the reference period from which to measure reductions 
in export subsidies.  Furthermore, the disciplines on domestic subsidies were weakened by changes in the 
definition of the Aggregate Measure of Support.  As a consequence, relatively little agricultural liberalization   4
UR-1 The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) is analyzed by simulating the effects of the 
phase-out of the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) under the Uruguay-Round (UR) Agreement. This is 
done by assuming complete elimination of the MFA export-tax equivalents on textiles and wearing 
apparel for the developing countries/regions subject to the MFA and other quotas imposed on their 
exports to the industrialized countries. 
 








  Table 1 provides aggregate, or economy-wide, results from the scenarios listed above for 
the countries/regions that have been modeled. Disaggregated sectoral results for the UR-3 scenario 
for the United States and for India are reported for illustrative purposes in tables 2-3. 
  To help the reader interpret the results, it is useful first to review the features of the model 
that serve to identify the various economic effects that are being captured in the different 
scenarios.  Although the model includes the aforementioned features of the New Trade Theory, it 
remains the case that markets respond to trade liberalization in much the same way that they 
would with perfect competition.  That is, when tariffs or other trade barriers are reduced in a 
sector, domestic buyers (both final and intermediate) substitute toward imports and the domestic 
competing industry contracts production while foreign exporters expand.  With multilateral 
liberalization reducing tariffs and other trade barriers simultaneously in most sectors and 
countries, each country’s industries share in both of these effects, expanding or contracting 
depending primarily on whether their protection is reduced more or less than in other sectors and 
countries.  At the same time, countries with larger average tariff reductions than their trading 
                                                                                                                                                 
was accomplished in the Uruguay Round negotiations.  In the absence of detailed information on the various 
agricultural policy changes that have been made, we have chosen therefore not to include agricultural 
liberalization in the Uruguay Round computational scenarios. 
5 See Francois and Strutt (1999) for details on the post-UR tariff rates. 
6 There have been a substantial number of CGE modeling studies of the Uruguay Round that are 
summarized and critiqued in Francois, McDonald, and Nordstrom (1996) and Francois (2001a).   5
partners tend to experience a real depreciation of their currencies in order to maintain a constant 
trade balance, so that all countries therefore experience mixtures of both expanding and 
contracting sectors. 
  Worldwide, these changes tend to cause increased international demand for all sectors, 
with world prices rising most for those sectors where trade barriers fall the most.  This in turn 
causes changes in countries’ terms of trade that can be positive or negative.  Those countries that 
are net exporters of goods with the greatest degree of import-tariff liberalization will experience 
increases in their terms of trade as the world prices of their exports rise relative to their imports.  
The reverse occurs for net exporters in industries where liberalization is slight  -- perhaps because 
it already happened in previous trade rounds. 
  The effects on the economic welfare of countries arise from a mixture of these terms-of-
trade effects, together with the standard efficiency gains from trade and also from additional 
effects due to elements of the New Trade Theory, the latter of which are mostly, but not all, 
beneficial.
 7  Thus, we expect on average that the world will gain from multilateral liberalization, 
as resources are reallocated to those sectors in each country where there is a comparative 
advantage. In the absence of terms-of-trade effects, these efficiency gains should raise national 
welfare measured by the equivalent variation for every country, although some factor owners 
within a country may lose, as will be noted below.  However, it is possible for a particular 
country whose net imports are concentrated in sectors with the greatest liberalization to lose 
overall, if the worsening of its terms of trade swamps these efficiency gains. 
On the other hand, although the New Trade Theory is perhaps best known for introducing 
new reasons why countries may lose from trade, in fact its greatest contribution is to expand the 
list of reasons for gains from trade.  It is these that are the dominant contribution of the New 
Trade Theory in our model.  That is, trade liberalization permits all countries to expand their 
                                                 
7 See discussion below.   6
export sectors at the same time that all sectors compete more closely with a larger number of 
competing varieties from abroad.  As a result, countries as a whole tend to gain from lower costs 
due to increasing returns to scale, lower monopoly distortions due to greater competition, and 
reduced costs and/or increased utility due to greater product variety.  All of these effects make it 
more likely that countries will gain from liberalization in ways that are shared across the entire 
population. 
  In perfectly competitive trade models such as the Heckscher-Ohlin Model, one expects 
countries as a whole to gain from trade, but the owners of one factor – the “scarce factor” – to 
lose through the mechanism first explored by Stolper and Samuelson (1941).  The additional 
sources of gain from trade due to increasing returns to scale, competition, and product variety, 
however, are shared across factors, and we routinely find in our CGE modeling that both labor 
and capital may gain from liberalization.  That is often the case here. 
One additional point about our model should be mentioned, related to the modeling and 
role of nontariff barriers (NTBs), such as those applying to textiles and apparel.  These are 
quantitative restrictions, captured in the model by endogenous tariff equivalents that rise and fall 
with changing supplies and demands for trade.  The tariff equivalents generate quota rents that 
accrue to whatever group is granted the rights to trade under the restriction, which in the case of 
the MFA are the developing countries that export textiles and wearing apparel.  Liberalization of 
these NTBs reduces or eliminates these quota rents, and this can be costly to those who possessed 
them disproportionately beforehand.  Therefore, it is not the case that exporting countries 
necessarily benefit from relaxation of these trade barriers, since their loss of quota rents can more 
than outweigh their gains from i ncreased exports.  Indeed, their exports can actually decline, 
along with their national welfare, if increased exports from other countries displace them in world 
markets.   7
  In the real world, all of these effects encompassed by the Michigan Model occur over 
time, some of them more quickly than others.  Our model is however static, based upon a single 
set of equilibrium conditions rather than relationships that vary over time.  Our results therefore 
refer to a time horizon that is somewhat uncertain, depending on the assumptions that have been 
made about which variables do and do not adjust to changing market conditions, and on the short- 
or long-run nature of these adjustments.  Because our elasticities of supply and demand reflect 
relatively long-run adjustments, and because we assume that markets for both labor and capital 
clear within countries, our results are appropriate for a relatively long time horizon of several 
years – perhaps two or three at a minimum. 
On the other hand, our model does not allow for the very long-run adjustments that could 
occur through capital accumulation, population growth, and technological change.  Our results 
should therefore be thought of as being superimposed upon longer-run growth paths of the 
economies involved.  To the extent that these growth paths themselves may be influenced by 
trade liberalization, therefore, our model does not capture that.  
Aggregate Results 
  In table 1, we report various economy-wide changes for each of the countries/regions of 
the model.  These include changes in exports and imports in millions of dollars, the changes in 
terms of trade, real wage rate and real return to capital in percentages, and changes in economic 
welfare measured by equivalent variation, both in millions of dollars and as percent of country 
GDP.  The terms of trade is the world price of a country’s exports relative to its imports.  The 
equivalent variation is the amount of money that, if given to the country’s consumers at initial 
prices, would be equivalent in terms of their level of welfare to the effects of the assumed 
liberalization.  In general, as discussed above, a worsening (fall) in a country’s terms of trade has 
an adverse effect on its consumers’ welfare.  But this can be outweighed by the other gains from 
trade due to economic efficiency and the other benefits modeled by the New Trade Theory.   8
  UR-1:  Elimination of the MFA Quota Constraints – The results for the Uruguay 
Round elimination of the MFA quota and other bilateral constraints on developing country 
exports of textiles and apparel, shown in Scenario UR-1 of table 1, indicate an increase in global 
welfare of $16.5 billion.  In interpreting the results, it should be noted that, with increased exports 
of these goods to world markets, their prices will fall and the terms of trade of the MFA exporting 
countries and their economic welfare may deteriorate.  This decline in terms of trade is 
experienced as a loss of quota rents from the MFA and can be seen in column (3) in table 1 for 
most of the developing countries/regions.  Several of those countries/regions also experience 
reductions in welfare.  The developed countries all gain from MFA elimination.  Changes in 
returns to labor and capital are mostly small. 
UR-2:  Liberalization of Manufactures  – Scenario  UR-2 in table 1 covers the 
reductions in import tariffs on manufactures that were negotiated in the Uruguay Round.  Global 
economic welfare increases by $56.5 billion and the gains are positive for all countries/regions.  
The largest welfare increases noted are for EU/EFTA ($17.4 billion), the United States ($11.2 
billion), and Japan ($6.6 billion).  The effects on returns to labor and capital are uniformly 
positive. 
  UR-3:  Combined Liberalization Effects (UR-1 + UR-2) – The combined effects of the 
Uruguay Round (UR) liberalization are indicated in Scenario UR-3 of table 1.  As noted, this 
table is the linear combination of UR-1 and UR-2.  Global welfare is increased by $73.0 billion.  
It is noteworthy that the developed countries all gain, with an increase in welfare of $23.7 billion 
for the EU/EFTA, $19.8 billion for the United States, and $6.9 billion for Japan.  All the 
developing countries/regions, except Hong Kong, show an increase in welfare from the combined 
UR liberalization.  Changes in the real wage and the return to capital are positive but relatively 
small for the developed countries, and relatively sizable in several of the Asian developing 
countries.   9
Sectoral Results 
  A major contribution of our CGE modeling is to identify those sectors that will expand 
and those that will contract as a result of various patterns of trade liberalization, as well as the 
sizes of these changes.  Given our assumption that expenditure adjusts within each country to 
maintain a constant level of total employment, it is necessarily the case that each country 
experiences a mixture of expansions and contractions at the industry level.  This must be true of 
employment, and it is likely to be true as well for industry output.  To report these sectoral results 
in any detail is tedious, since there are 18 sectors in each country/region.  We therefore report, in 
tables 2-3, the sectoral results only for the combined UR liberalization for the United States and 
India, for illustrative purposes.  The sectoral results for the other scenarios and countries/regions 
are available from the authors on request. 
  For the United States, there are increases in employment in all sectors, except for textiles 
(-32,077) and wearing apparel (-97,094), reflecting especially the effects of elimination of the 
MFA quota constraints.  For India, the largest employment increases are in textiles (388,154), 
wearing apparel (231,338), trade and transport (124,360), leather products & footwear (42,892), 
and mining (46,546).  India’s largest employment declines are in agriculture (-143,922), wood & 
wood products (-226,363), and industrial products and machinery.  The percentage changes in 
employment are relatively small for the United States, except in textiles and wearing apparel.  
The employment changes for India are relatively sizable in several sectors.  In interpreting the 
employment changes, it should be noted that these changes would be mitigated given that the UR 
liberalization has been phased in over a ten-year period.  We may also note, from the changes 
reported for Scale (output per firm), that there is evidence of positive scale effects for most of the 
sectors.   10 
IV. Computational Analysis of the Doha Development Round  
  In this section, using the Michigan Model, we report some of the economic effects that 
may result from the ongoing Doha Development Round of multilateral trade negotiations.  The 
Doha Round was launched officially at the beginning of 2002 and is scheduled for conclusion by 
the end of 2004.
8  The Doha Round scenarios here assume 33 percent reductions in post-Uruguay 
Round tariffs and services barriers, as follows: 
DR-1 Agricultural liberalization is modeled as a 33 percent reduction in post-Uruguay Round 
agricultural import tariffs, export subsidies, and domestic production subsidies.
 
 
DR-2  Liberalization of manufactures is modeled as a 33 percent reduction in post-Uruguay 
Round tariffs on manufactures. 
 
DR-3 Services liberalization is modeled as a 33 percent reduction in estimated post-Uruguay 
Round services barriers. 
 
DR-4 This combines DR-1, DR-2, and DR-3. 
 
Data 
  As noted in Section II, our basic data source is the GTAP-4 Database, supplemented with 
employment data, and projected to 2005, which is when the Uruguay Round will have been fully 
implemented.  The projected database has in turn been readjusted to include the results of the 
Uruguay Round implementation as analyzed above. 
  While services issues were addressed in the Uruguay Round, the main accomplishment 
was the creation of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which is an umbrella 
agreement setting out the rules governing the four modes of providing services transactions.  
These modes include:  (1) cross-border services (e.g., telecommunications); (2) services provided 
to consumers visiting from abroad (e.g., tourism); (3) services requiring a domestic presence in 
the form of foreign direct investment (FDI); and (4) movement of natural persons. In an earlier 
study, Brown and Stern (2001) developed a new version of the Michigan Model for the purpose 
                                                 
8 As was the case in our analysis of the Uruguay Round negotiations, we do not consider the effects of the   11 
of analyzing the behavior of multinational firms, which are major providers of services, both 
intra-firm as well as in the production and sales of foreign affiliates located in host countries.
9 To 
approximate existing services barriers, Brown and Stern used estimates of barriers to FDI 
provided by Hoekman (2000), based on the gross operating margins of services firms listed on 
national stock exchanges for the period, 1994-96.
10  We use these estimates here as ad valorem 
equivalent tariffs for the services sectors included in the current version of the Michigan Model.  
Our simulation DR-3 assumes then that the services barriers are to be reduced by 33 percent in 
the Doha Round.  
Aggregate Results
11 
The aggregate results of the assumed Doha Round scenarios are presented in table 4, and 
the  sectoral results of the combined scenarios ( DR-4) for the United States and India are 
presented in tables 5 and 6. 
DR-1:  Agricultural Liberalization – The results for assumed 33 percent reductions in 
post-Uruguay Round agricultural import tariffs, export subsidies, and production subsidies (taken 
here as a proxy for the Aggregate Measure of Support) are shown in table 4.  The more detailed 
                                                                                                                                                 
negotiations on the various rules and procedures to be covered in the Doha Round. 
9 Because of computer-capacity constraints, Brown and Stern used a 3-sector aggregation consisting of 
agriculture, manufactures, and services and a 20-country/region breakdown.  They also made allowance for 
international flows of FDI and increases in capital stocks in response to the multilateral trade liberalization 
that they analyzed. 
10The gross operating margins were calculated as the differences between total revenues and total operating 
costs for construction, trade and transport, other private services, and government services.  Some of the 
differences between total revenues and costs are presumably attributable to fixed cost.  Given that the gross 
operating margins vary across countries, a portion of the margins can also be attributed to barriers to FDI.  
For this purpose, we have selected as a benchmark for each sector the country with the smallest gross 
operating margin, on the assumption that operations in this country can be considered to be freely open to 
foreign firms.  The excess in any other country above the lowest benchmark is then taken to be due to 
barriers to establishment by foreign firms.  That is, the barrier is modeled as the cost increase attributable to 
an increase in fixed cost borne by multinational corporations attempting to establish an enterprise locally in 
a host country.  We further assume for purposes of our analysis here that we can interpret this cost increase 
as an ad valorem equivalent tariff on international services transactions generally.  Further details are 
available from the authors on request. 
11 The potential gains from the Doha Round are also analyzed in Hertel (2000) and Hertel, Hoekman, and 
Martin (2002).  These studies are based on the GTAP CGE model, which is a widely used modeling 
structure.  Perfect competition is assumed in all sectors.  National product differentiation ( i.e., the   12 
results are available from the authors on request.  In the model, the reductions in agricultural 
import tariffs will have the effects of tariff reductions already described.  In the case of export 
subsidies, their effects will be to reduce world prices and raise domestic prices.  When export 
subsidies are reduced, world prices would then rise and domestic prices in the subsidizing 
countries would fall, with the possible consequences that economic welfare may rise in the 
countries reducing their export subsidies and fall in net-importing countries now facing higher 
world prices.  Similarly, production subsidies will have the effect of reducing prices both 
domestically and abroad.  When production subsidies are reduced, the cost of agricultural 
products will rise with consequent terms-of-trade effects similar to those just discussed.  In 
addition, depending on the input-output structure, a rise in the cost of agricultural inputs will push 
up marginal cost relative to average total cost in some sectors.  In order to return to the optimal 
markup of price relative to marginal cost, firm output in these sectors has to fall, and economic 
welfare may then decline due to reduced scale economies.   
In the underlying results, the reductions in agricultural import tariffs alone increase 
global economic welfare by $9.5 billion.  Welfare increases in the EU/EFTA, Japan, the Asian 
developing countries, Mexico, and Turkey as resources are shifted away from agriculture.  
Correspondingly, welfare declines in Australia/New Zealand, Canada, and the United States as 
resources are shifted to agriculture and away from nonagricultural increasing returns industries.  
As noted above, when export subsidies are reduced, world prices would rise and domestic prices 
would fall.  This is borne out in the underlying results insofar as welfare increases in the 
EU/EFTA and declines in all of the countries/regions in the model, except Thailand.  Global 
welfare falls by an estimated $23.2 billion.  When production subsidies are reduced, domestic and 
foreign prices rise, and depending on input-output structures, the increased cost of agricultural 
inputs may cause firm output in some sectors to decline for the reasons discussed above.  In the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Armington assumption) is also assumed, which may tend to exaggerate terms-of-trade effects.   13 
underlying results, it turns out that the EU/EFTA region benefits the most when its agricultural 
production subsidies are reduced, whereas welfare declines for most developing 
countries/regions.  Global welfare rises by $10.6 billion.  Agricultural liberalization thus involves 
a complex of differential changes because both tariffs and subsidies are being reduced.  The net 
effect indicated in Table 4 is a reduction in global welfare of $3.1 billion. 
  DR-2:  Liberalization of Manufactures – The assumed 33 percent reduction of post-
Uruguay Round manufactures tariffs results in an increase in global welfare of $163.4 billion, 
which is considerably greater than the $56.5 billion welfare gain from the Uruguay Round 
manufactures liberalization.  As was the case in the Uruguay Round results, the assumed 
liberalization of manufactures in the Doha Round would increase welfare in all of the 
countries/regions listed and would have positive effects as well on real wages and the return to 
capital.  The largest welfare gains are for Japan ($45.2 billion), the EU/EFTA ($39.3 billion), and 
the United States ($23.6 billion).  While the welfare gains for the developing countries/regions 
are much smaller in absolute terms, the percentage gains are mostly larger, ranging from 0.2 
percent for Central & South America to 5.5 percent for the Philippines.
12  There are also sizable 
percentage increases in the real factor returns in the Asian developing economies.  
  DR-3:  Services Liberalization – As noted above, the Uruguay Round negotiations on 
services resulted in creation of the GATS, but no significant liberalization of services barriers 
occurred.  Following the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, there have been successful 
multilateral negotiations to liberalize telecommunications and financial services.  While it would 
be desirable to assess the economic effects of these sectoral agreements, we cannot do so because 
of lack of data.  What we have done then is to use the estimates of services barriers based on the 
                                                 
12 Our results differ from those obtained by Hertel, Hoekman, and Martin (2002, p. 121), who conclude 
that:  “…the bulk of the gains go to developing countries, which are estimated to receive three quarters of 
the total gains from liberalizing manufacturing trade.”  The differences in our results compared to Hertel et 
al. most likely stem from the assumptions made in projecting the database for the model to 2005.  That is, 
Hertel et al. project significantly greater expansions of the output and trade of the developing countries than   14 
calculations of gross operating margins for services firms in the countries/regions in our model, 
as already described.  These estimates of services barriers are intended to be indirect 
approximations o f what the actual barriers may in fact be.  Assuming that the ad valorem 
equivalents of these barriers are reduced by 33 percent, it can be seen in table 4 that global 
economic welfare rises by $413.7 billion, which exceeds the $163.4 billion welfare increase for 
manufactures liberalization.  All of the countries/regions listed experience positive welfare gains 
as well as increases in real wages and returns to capital.  The EU/EFTA region has the largest 
welfare gain of $142.0 billion for the group of industrialized countries, compared to $131.4 
billion for the United States, and $57.9 billion for Japan.  For the smaller industrialized and 
developing countries, the percentage increases in welfare and factor returns are especially 
noteworthy.  It should be borne in mind that these results of services liberalization depend on the 
size of the services barriers that have been calculated indirectly from financial data and may 
possibly be overstated.  It seems fair to say nonetheless that services barriers tend to  be 
considerably greater than the tariff on manufactures. 
  DR-4:  Combined Liberalization Effects (DR-1 + DR-2 + DR-3) – The results for DR-
4 are a linear combination of the other three scenarios.  Overall, in table 4, global welfare rises by 
$574.0 billion.  Among the industrialized countries, the EU/EFTA region has a welfare gain of 
$209.6 billion, the United States a gain of $144.0 billion, and Japan a gain of $100.2 billion.  The 
percentage welfare gains and increases in returns to factors are sizable in most of the smaller 
industrialized countries and in the developing countries. 
Sectoral Results  
The sectoral results for DR-4 in the United States and India are presented for illustrative 
purposes in tables 5 and 6.  The sectoral results for other scenarios and countries/regions are 
available from the authors on request.  The largest employment increases for the United States are 
                                                                                                                                                 
in our simpler extrapolations noted above.   15 
in agriculture (75,688), food, beverages, and tobacco (23,186), wood & wood products (12,854), 
and government services (14,902). There are employment declines in textiles (-18,400), wearing 
apparel (-52,045), leather products & footwear (-3,642), trade and transport (-23,770), and other 
private services (-32,537).  For India, there are employment increases in mining (69,399), food, 
beverages, and tobacco (60,680), textiles (148,189), wearing apparel (95,004), leather products & 
footwear (69,967), construction (20,273), and government services (340,109).  The employment 
declines are in agriculture (-449,828), industrial products and durable manufactures, and trade 
and transport (-35,549).  As was the case with the sectoral results for the Uruguay Round trade 
liberalization noted in tables 2 and 3, it can expected that the Doha Round trade liberalization will 
be phased in over a period of several years so that possible sectoral employment dislocations 
would be mitigated. 
 
V. Conclusions and Implications  
  The following conclusions can be drawn from our computational analysis of the Uruguay 
Round trade negotiations: 
•  The elimination of the MFA quota constraints is beneficial to economic welfare in the 
developed countries but detrimental to some of the developing countries/regions.  The 
detrimental effects occur because of the decline in world prices and deterioration of the 
exporting countries’ terms of trade, including the loss of quota rents. 
 
•  Because there is considerable evidence of backsliding from the formal Uruguay Round 
commitments to reduce agricultural import tariffs, export subsidies, and production 
subsidies, we assumed that no s ignificant agricultural liberalization resulted from the 
Uruguay Round. 
 
•  The liberalization of trade in manufactures was beneficial to all the developed and 
developing countries/regions covered in the model. 
 
•  The combined effects of the Uruguay Round trade liberalization were welfare increasing 
for the developed and developing countries/regions, except for Hong Kong.  The largest 
absolute gains were for the developed countries. 
 
•  The sectoral effects of the Uruguay Round trade liberalization varied, depending on the 
patterns of liberalization for individual countries.  Employment dislocations appeared   16 




The computational results of assumed 33 percent reductions of trade barriers in the Doha  
Development Round negotiations can be summarized as follows: 
•  The assumed reductions in agricultural import tariffs, export subsidies, and production 
subsidies suggested that the EU/EFTA were the prime beneficiaries.  The net effect on 
global welfare was negative, with the overall welfare decline from the reduction in export 
subsidies offsetting the overall gains from reductions in import tariffs and production 
subsidies. 
 
•  The effects of manufactures liberalization were uniformly positive for all developed and 
developing countries/regions.  The industrialized countries had the largest absolute 
welfare increases, while several developing countries/regions had sizable gains as a 
percentage of their GDP. 
 
•  All of the developed and developing countries/regions had significant increases in 
welfare due to the assumed liberalization of services barriers.  These welfare increases 
were substantially greater than the increases due to manufactures liberalization, although 
that result especially depends, of course, on the estimated sizes of the trade barriers in 
services and the extent to which they will be reduced. 
 
•  The combined effects of the assumed Doha Development Round liberalization were 
sizable in both absolute and percentage terms for the developed and developing 
countries/regions.  The largest absolute gains were for the developed countries. 
 
•  Sectoral employment dislocations would be mitigated insofar as the Doha Round 
liberalization would be phased in over several years time. 
 
Our computational results thus suggest that there are substantial benefits to be realized  
from the Doha Development Round negotiations, especially for manufactures and services and 
for both developed and developing countries.  This is in contrast to the effects of the Uruguay 
Round trade liberalization, which may have been tilted against developing countries.
13 
We should note, as discussed above, that our computational model is based on a 
comparative static approach, meaning that we move from an initial position to a new equilibrium 
                                                 
13 See Finger and Nogues for arguments of how and why many of the aspects of the Uruguay Round 
negotiations resulted in an outcome that was unbalanced against the developing countries and the 
implications from the Uruguay Round experience that may be applicable in a new trade round.   17 
in which all of the liberalization occurs at one time.  That is, we abstract from a variety of 
dynamic and related effects that may occur through time, especially the international mobility of 
real capital, increases in real investment via capital accumulation, and technological 
improvements.  The economic benefits that we have calculated, especially for the Doha 
Development Round, may therefore be interpreted as a lower bound for the benefits that may be 
realized from the multilateral trade negotiations.
14 
                                                 
14 See Francois (2001a, esp. pp. 31-34) for an elaboration of how the usefulness of CGE modeling studies 
can be improved in applications to the Doha Round negotiations.   18 
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 Country Imports Exports Terms of Real Wage Return
Trade to Capital
(Millions) (Millions) (Percent) (Percent) (Millions) (Percent) (Percent)
Developed Countries
     Australia & New Zealand 144.7 114.0 0.030 0.018 94.5 0.012 0.028
     Canada 782.3 719.4 0.065 0.094 683.8 0.066 0.133
     European Union and EFTA 2517.7 2275.1 0.055 0.058 6320.8 0.051 0.071
     Japan -121.4 191.0 -0.050 0.004 257.1 -0.002 0.012
     United States 6497.4 4482.0 0.148 0.095 8608.2 0.084 0.114
Developing Countries
  Asia
     India 1517.9 1992.1 -0.954 0.231 972.2 0.224 0.238
     Sri Lanka 98.7 159.1 -1.101 0.143 23.8 0.032 0.251
     Rest of South Asia 449.1 652.8 -1.088 0.263 307.4 0.207 0.319
     China 1849.7 2760.4 -0.366 -0.161 -1458.5 -0.120 -0.194
     Hong Kong 1544.3 1364.5 0.187 -0.473 -609.2 0.121 -0.988
     South Korea 405.0 428.0 -0.015 0.025 142.7 0.045 0.006
     Singapore -510.4 -591.4 0.054 -0.001 -0.8 -0.025 0.020
     Indonesia 147.5 207.8 -0.089 -0.005 -13.8 0.030 -0.032
     Malaysia 223.0 354.0 -0.121 0.275 328.7 0.735 0.025
     Philippines 2080.9 2513.8 -1.316 0.900 794.3 2.057 0.045
     Thailand 140.3 259.0 -0.143 0.029 59.4 0.161 -0.019
  Other
     Mexico -45.3 24.8 -0.030 -0.010 -36.6 -0.010 -0.010
     Turkey -157.3 -120.0 -0.094 -0.015 -31.6 -0.031 -0.006
     Central Europe -20.3 -0.6 -0.026 0.037 138.3 0.026 0.054
     Central & South America -162.9 -106.2 -0.050 -0.004 -73.9 -0.002 -0.006
Total 17380.9 17679.5 16506.8
Welfare
Scenario UR-1:  Removal of the Multifiber Arrangement
Table 1
Summary Results of the Uruguay Round
Change in Imports, Exports, Terms of Trade, Welfare and 
the Real Return to Capital and LaborCountry Imports Exports Terms of Real Wage Return
Trade to Capital
(Millions) (Millions) (Percent) (Percent) (Millions) (Percent) (Percent)
Developed Countries
     Australia & New Zealand 2848.0 2527.6 0.347 0.327 1674.8 0.345 0.300
     Canada 1071.9 1354.5 -0.086 0.127 926.3 0.137 0.114
     European Union and EFTA 16826.6 15358.5 0.145 0.159 17405.6 0.157 0.163
     Japan 8680.6 8331.3 0.062 0.102 6608.4 0.092 0.115
     United States 12426.0 13459.3 -0.133 0.123 11187.1 0.124 0.122
Developing Countries
  Asia
     India 2585.3 3628.9 -2.099 0.446 1875.4 0.316 0.577
     Sri Lanka 98.8 106.3 -0.193 0.558 93.0 0.507 0.608
     Rest of South Asia 3454.8 4820.1 -7.541 2.025 2366.5 2.224 1.828
     China 3112.6 1917.7 0.456 0.305 2762.2 0.347 0.271
     Hong Kong 763.5 480.1 0.254 0.360 464.1 0.346 0.373
     South Korea 2858.6 2733.2 0.068 0.422 2403.3 0.409 0.435
     Singapore 3539.8 3647.5 -0.078 2.111 1570.3 1.943 2.258
     Indonesia 936.5 894.5 0.068 0.247 626.0 0.291 0.215
     Malaysia 2790.9 3411.4 -0.563 1.919 2293.9 1.816 1.974
     Philippines 2452.6 3102.1 -1.989 1.917 1691.7 1.853 1.964
     Thailand 1264.7 1002.3 0.291 0.366 753.9 0.597 0.283
  Other
     Mexico -64.9 1.4 -0.026 0.019 66.3 0.038 0.010
     Turkey 319.3 253.9 0.143 0.123 259.1 0.122 0.124
     Central Europe 1871.7 1846.1 0.020 0.294 1091.2 0.311 0.270
     Central & South America 3778.8 2999.5 0.423 0.022 377.1 0.043 0.004
Total 71616.2 71876.4 56496.0
Scenario UR-2: Tariff Reductions in Manufactures
Welfare
Table 1 (continued)Country Imports Exports Terms of Real Wage Return
Trade to Capital
(Millions) (Millions) (Percent) (Percent) (Millions) (Percent) (Percent)
Developed Countries
     Australia & New Zealand 2992.8 2641.6 0.377 0.345 1769.3 0.357 0.328
     Canada 1854.2 2073.9 -0.021 0.221 1610.1 0.202 0.247
     European Union and EFTA 19344.2 17633.6 0.200 0.216 23726.4 0.208 0.234
     Japan 8559.2 8522.3 0.011 0.106 6865.5 0.090 0.127
     United States 18923.4 17941.3 0.014 0.218 19795.3 0.208 0.236
Developing Countries
  Asia
     India 4103.2 5620.9 -3.053 0.677 2847.5 0.540 0.815
     Sri Lanka 197.5 265.4 -1.293 0.701 116.8 0.539 0.859
     Rest of South Asia 3903.9 5473.0 -8.629 2.288 2673.9 2.430 2.147
     China 4962.4 4678.2 0.089 0.144 1303.8 0.227 0.077
     Hong Kong 2307.9 1844.7 0.442 -0.113 -145.1 0.467 -0.615
     South Korea 3263.6 3161.2 0.053 0.447 2546.1 0.454 0.441
     Singapore 3029.4 3056.1 -0.024 2.110 1569.4 1.917 2.278
     Indonesia 1084.0 1102.4 -0.021 0.242 612.2 0.321 0.183
     Malaysia 3013.9 3765.4 -0.684 2.194 2622.6 2.552 1.999
     Philippines 4533.4 5615.9 -3.305 2.817 2486.0 3.910 2.009
     Thailand 1405.0 1261.3 0.148 0.395 813.3 0.758 0.264
  Other
     Mexico -110.2 26.1 -0.056 0.008 29.6 0.027 0.000
     Turkey 162.0 133.9 0.049 0.108 227.6 0.091 0.117
     Central Europe 1851.4 1845.5 -0.006 0.331 1229.4 0.336 0.324
     Central & South America 3615.9 2893.3 0.373 0.017 303.2 0.041 -0.002
Total 88997.2 89555.9 73002.8
Welfare
Scenario UR-3: Uruguay Round Combined Liberalization
Table 1 (continued)Product Exports Imports Supply Scale
(Percent) (Percent) (Percent) (Percent) (Percent) (000's)
Agriculture 1.24 -0.89 0.37 0.00 0.37 14967.1
Mining 2.53 -0.93 0.77 0.33 0.44 3103.9
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 8.40 12.27 0.24 0.22 0.04 1236.0
Textiles -0.08 8.38 -2.59 0.01 -2.59 -32076.8
Wearing Apparel -1.83 26.37 -7.94 0.57 -8.39 -97094.5
Leather Products & Footwear 2.86 0.33 0.20 0.21 0.04 27.0
Wood & Wood Products 2.04 0.18 0.28 0.16 0.17 7512.7
Chemicals 2.13 1.57 0.21 0.22 0.03 931.1
Non-metallic Min. Products 1.74 2.61 0.07 0.16 -0.04 -283.1
Metal Products 2.15 0.39 0.42 0.25 0.21 5823.1
Transportation Equipment 2.12 -0.49 0.65 0.27 0.40 10645.1
Machinery & Equipment 1.61 2.02 0.23 0.21 0.11 2366.5
Other Manufactures 2.24 0.28 0.60 0.21 0.46 8227.8
Elec., Gas & Water 0.25 -0.04 0.16 0.17 0.03 1341.3
Construction 1.54 -1.00 0.15 0.17 0.01 1918.4
Trade and Transport 1.27 -2.63 0.25 0.18 0.11 34642.6
Other Private Services 1.49 -1.39 0.25 0.21 0.08 30102.6
Government Services 1.05 -0.97 0.05 0.06 0.02 6609.4
Average 1.95 1.74 0.15 0.00 0.00
Employment
Table 2
Sectoral Results of the Uruguay Round
Percent Change in Exports, Imports, Output, Scale and Employment
United StatesProduct Exports Imports Supply Scale
(Percent) (Percent) (Percent) (Percent) (Percent) (000's)
Agriculture 0.70 -2.04 -0.09 0.00 -0.05 -143922.3
Mining 3.73 -2.07 1.79 0.67 1.41 46546.0
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 5.18 10.66 0.06 0.35 -0.07 -7841.8
Textiles 18.86 7.43 4.34 1.25 3.34 388153.9
Wearing Apparel 54.34 -9.57 29.23 1.33 28.26 231337.8
Leather Products & Footwear 7.97 34.60 4.61 1.21 3.70 42892.0
Wood & Wood Products 4.81 31.29 -2.68 0.60 -3.09 -226363.1
Chemicals 4.44 12.54 -1.02 0.70 -1.46 -21998.1
Non-metallic Min. Products 6.55 22.26 -0.45 0.66 -0.94 -32502.0
Metal Products 4.37 7.23 -2.34 0.65 -2.76 -96777.2
Transportation Equipment 7.09 25.24 -1.62 0.79 -2.23 -30912.3
Machinery & Equipment 2.65 16.36 -5.65 1.10 -6.56 -156588.3
Other Manufactures 2.60 19.31 -1.55 0.76 -1.98 -106883.9
Elec., Gas & Water 4.37 -2.27 1.21 1.11 0.36 6171.9
Construction 2.86 -2.68 -0.27 -0.03 -0.08 -11520.2
Trade and Transport 2.49 -2.99 0.33 0.28 0.26 124360.2
Other Private Services 2.05 -2.39 -0.24 -0.06 -0.03 -962.6
Government Services 1.57 -2.12 -0.18 -0.03 -0.01 -3189.9
Average 11.31 8.22 0.43 0.00 0.0
Employment
Table 3 
Sectoral Results of the Uruguay Round
Percent Change in Exports, Imports, Output, Scale and Employment
IndiaCountry Imports Exports Terms of Real Wage Return
Trade to Capital
(Millions) (Millions) (Percent) (Percent) (Millions) (Percent) (Percent)
Developed Countries
     Australia & New Zealand 566.2 -168.1 0.798 -0.063 -320.7 -0.182 -0.224
     Canada -248.6 -768.3 0.168 -0.051 -368.4 -0.218 -0.209
     European Union and EFTA 157.1 416.2 -0.041 0.258 28328.0 -0.045 0.023
     Japan 564.3 3199.9 -0.470 -0.044 -2826.4 -0.039 -0.003
     United States 2690.9 928.3 0.219 -0.122 -11081.1 -0.190 -0.193
Developing Countries
  Asia
     India 324.2 285.3 0.066 0.384 1617.4 -0.109 -0.030
     Sri Lanka -93.9 -67.5 -0.240 -2.734 -455.7 -0.307 -0.480
     Rest of South Asia 106.6 157.2 -0.118 0.310 362.1 -0.078 -0.119
     China -522.8 -652.7 -0.013 -0.434 -3932.0 -0.163 -0.320
     Hong Kong -380.7 -256.9 -0.026 -0.294 -379.0 -0.186 -0.180
     South Korea 285.4 912.9 -0.333 -0.230 -1311.4 0.132 0.134
     Singapore -153.9 -39.5 -0.067 -0.244 -181.4 -0.038 -0.068
     Indonesia -436.5 -466.7 -0.006 -1.259 -3185.5 -0.113 -0.462
     Malaysia -10.8 49.0 -0.076 -0.264 -315.8 0.189 0.104
     Philippines -344.8 -241.8 -0.199 -1.336 -1179.1 -0.062 -0.076
     Thailand -621.2 -1119.3 0.613 0.045 92.4 -0.703 0.054
  Other
     Mexico -200.7 -193.6 -0.089 -0.121 -425.6 -0.354 -0.185
     Turkey -189.1 -119.0 -0.087 -0.414 -871.4 -0.327 -0.347
     Central Europe -432.7 -428.6 0.025 -0.457 -1695.6 -0.363 -0.391
     Central & South America 1500.6 870.3 0.377 -0.285 -4988.0 -0.252 -0.358
Total 2559.5 2297.3 -3117.2
Table 4
Summary Results of the Doha Development Round
Change in Imports, Exports, Terms of Trade, Welfare and
the Real Return to Capital and Labor
Welfare
Scenario DR-1:  33 Percent Reduction in Agricultural ProtectionCountry Imports Exports Terms of Real Wage Return
Trade to Capital
(Millions) (Millions) (Percent) (Percent) (Millions) (Percent) (Percent)
Developed Countries
     Australia & New Zealand 3720.7 3457.2 0.267 0.545 2790.6 0.508 0.515
     Canada 1996.0 2097.3 -0.013 0.347 2526.2 0.216 0.251
     European Union and EFTA 23184.8 22840.3 0.050 0.358 39273.0 0.190 0.199
     Japan 19071.4 15817.0 0.548 0.696 45190.9 0.234 0.304
     United States 20454.2 18337.3 0.167 0.260 23634.2 0.198 0.224
Developing Countries
  Asia
     India 3280.4 4054.2 -1.384 0.733 3084.4 0.439 0.592
     Sri Lanka 536.8 592.1 -1.025 3.207 534.5 1.565 2.010
     Rest of South Asia 1892.0 2018.4 -0.604 1.895 2214.7 0.889 1.025
     China 16080.3 19416.3 -1.221 1.199 10859.3 1.470 1.323
     Hong Kong 3182.8 1840.3 1.246 1.444 1859.1 0.947 0.647
     South Korea 8023.4 8440.7 -0.233 1.515 8622.9 1.158 1.003
     Singapore 4382.9 4161.8 0.131 2.276 1692.5 2.481 2.611
     Indonesia 2362.7 2336.0 0.053 0.835 2113.3 0.645 0.447
     Malaysia 4242.8 4805.2 -0.488 2.555 3055.1 2.896 2.812
     Philippines 3984.0 4535.1 -1.192 5.478 4834.4 3.310 2.461
     Thailand 3406.1 3970.1 -0.675 0.873 1798.6 1.664 0.972
  Other
     Mexico 916.3 1132.6 -0.166 0.364 1283.1 0.195 0.204
     Turkey 1421.0 1558.6 -0.335 0.827 1740.3 0.349 0.272
     Central Europe 3866.3 4366.4 -0.428 0.734 2724.2 0.816 0.722
     Central & South America 5038.9 6103.2 -0.612 0.206 3610.0 0.159 0.108
Total 131043.7 131880.0 163441.4
Table 4 (continued)
Welfare
Scenario DR-2: 33 Percent Reduction in Manufactures TariffsCountry Imports Exports Terms of Real Wage Return
Trade to Capital
(Millions) (Millions) (Percent) (Percent) (Millions) (Percent) (Percent)
Developed Countries
     Australia & New Zealand 2354.4 1962.3 0.385 1.050 5379.6 0.694 0.657
     Canada 2244.0 2136.3 0.083 0.811 5910.4 0.317 0.316
     European Union and EFTA 35478.1 35336.8 0.032 1.295 142003.2 0.553 0.546
     Japan 14797.7 15501.6 -0.067 0.891 57875.1 0.247 0.277
     United States 32467.7 32231.5 -0.033 1.448 131426.8 0.524 0.534
Developing Countries
  Asia
     India 919.2 803.9 0.212 0.552 2321.6 0.170 0.204
     Sri Lanka 121.7 99.1 0.335 1.202 200.4 0.881 0.507
     Rest of South Asia 374.3 286.7 0.286 0.689 804.9 0.293 0.453
     China 5660.3 6210.9 -0.128 1.320 11959.1 0.840 0.603
     Hong Kong 7587.2 8058.4 -0.611 4.382 5643.1 5.638 5.927
     South Korea 4842.2 5002.5 -0.102 1.339 7619.5 0.913 0.956
     Singapore 3325.1 3776.2 -0.297 3.322 2470.8 4.821 3.972
     Indonesia 1401.3 1469.4 -0.072 1.256 3177.0 0.327 0.307
     Malaysia 1487.6 1466.8 0.049 1.267 1514.5 1.026 0.928
     Philippines 1986.7 2195.0 -0.462 2.342 2067.1 1.739 1.622
     Thailand 3324.2 3625.3 -0.413 1.401 2886.4 1.088 0.904
  Other
     Mexico 863.1 809.1 0.110 0.878 3099.3 0.204 0.195
     Turkey 1733.3 1462.9 0.589 1.781 3745.9 0.695 0.884
     Central Europe 3841.7 3744.5 0.061 1.409 5227.2 1.067 0.996
     Central & South America 4199.9 4442.8 -0.179 1.050 18363.5 0.256 0.272
Total 129009.6 130621.8 413695.4
Table 4 (contined)
Welfare
Scenario DR-3:  33 Percent Reduction in Services BarriersCountry Imports Exports Terms of Real Wage Return
Trade to Capital
(Millions) (Millions) (Percent) (Percent) (Millions) (Percent) (Percent)
Developed Countries
     Australia & New Zealand 6641.2 5251.4 1.449 1.532 7849.3 1.020 0.947
     Canada 3991.3 3465.3 0.238 1.107 8068.2 0.315 0.359
     European Union and EFTA 58819.3 58592.5 0.041 1.911 209609.8 0.697 0.768
     Japan 34433.4 34518.5 0.012 1.544 100239.5 0.442 0.579
     United States 55612.4 51496.8 0.353 1.586 143980.5 0.533 0.565
Developing Countries
  Asia
     India 4523.7 5143.3 -1.106 1.669 7023.4 0.500 0.766
     Sri Lanka 564.6 623.7 -0.930 1.675 279.2 2.139 2.037
     Rest of South Asia 2372.9 2462.3 -0.436 2.894 3381.8 1.104 1.360
     China 21217.8 24974.6 -1.361 2.085 18886.9 2.148 1.606
     Hong Kong 10389.2 9641.7 0.609 5.532 7123.1 6.399 6.394
     South Korea 13151.0 14356.1 -0.668 2.624 14930.8 2.203 2.094
     Singapore 7554.0 7898.6 -0.233 5.354 3982.0 7.264 6.516
     Indonesia 3327.5 3338.6 -0.025 0.832 2104.8 0.858 0.292
     Malaysia 5719.6 6321.0 -0.515 3.558 4253.8 4.111 3.845
     Philippines 5625.9 6488.3 -1.854 6.485 5722.5 4.987 4.007
     Thailand 6109.1 6476.1 -0.475 2.319 4777.4 2.050 1.930
  Other
     Mexico 1578.6 1748.0 -0.145 1.122 3957.0 0.045 0.214
     Turkey 2965.1 2902.4 0.167 2.194 4614.5 0.718 0.809
     Central Europe 7275.2 7682.1 -0.342 1.686 6255.3 1.521 1.327
     Central & South America 10739.4 11416.1 -0.414 0.971 16985.8 0.163 0.021
Total 262611.2 264797.6 574025.4
Scenario UR-4: 33 Percent Reduction in all Trade Barriers
Welfare
Table 4 (continued)Product Exports Imports Supply Scale
(Percent) (Percent) (Percent) (Percent) (Percent) (000's)
Agriculture 13.90 4.06 1.86 0.00 1.87 75688.4
Mining 1.26 0.52 0.61 0.65 -0.02 -131.6
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 7.63 -2.83 0.27 -0.44 0.73 23186.0
Textiles 2.18 5.96 -1.29 0.28 -1.53 -18399.5
Wearing Apparel 6.15 11.31 -4.30 0.76 -4.89 -52044.9
Leather Products & Footwear 3.44 6.18 -4.56 0.94 -5.31 -3642.3
Wood & Wood Products 2.23 -0.10 0.50 0.29 0.29 12853.9
Chemicals 3.36 1.94 0.67 0.61 0.12 3424.3
Non-metallic Min. Products 3.06 3.89 0.25 0.48 -0.07 -571.0
Metal Products 2.11 1.87 0.44 0.60 -0.08 -2239.2
Transportation Equipment 1.63 2.33 0.39 0.66 -0.23 -6108.3
Machinery & Equipment 1.88 1.97 0.48 0.48 0.18 4030.0
Other Manufactures 2.50 1.89 0.49 0.53 0.13 2336.8
Elec., Gas & Water 0.70 -0.18 0.42 0.47 0.03 1284.8
Construction 10.25 11.80 0.42 0.47 0.01 1737.6
Trade and Transport 9.79 16.71 0.44 0.64 -0.08 -23770.4
Other Private Services 13.44 22.60 0.59 0.79 -0.09 -32536.9
Government Services 12.47 17.68 0.25 0.32 0.06 14902.1
Average 5.49 4.98 0.42 0.00 0.00
Employment
Table 5
Sectoral Results of the Doha Development Round of Trade Negotiations
Percent Change in Exports, Imports, Output, Scale and Employment
United StatesProduct Exports Imports Supply Scale
(Percent) (Percent) (Percent) (Percent) (Percent) (000's)
Agriculture 11.50 0.71 -0.19 0.00 -0.15 -449827.9
Mining 5.43 -1.84 2.68 1.03 2.07 69399.1
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 7.75 17.83 0.40 0.06 0.52 60679.6
Textiles 8.69 21.56 1.82 0.78 1.23 148188.9
Wearing Apparel 14.06 24.77 9.30 0.86 8.75 95004.0
Leather Products & Footwear 9.30 9.13 6.63 1.10 5.82 69966.9
Wood & Wood Products 5.40 5.53 0.03 0.46 -0.27 -18859.3
Chemicals 5.75 10.53 -0.65 0.92 -1.29 -19167.5
Non-metallic Min. Products 7.61 15.32 0.55 0.92 -0.20 -6811.1
Metal Products 5.23 11.70 -2.15 1.13 -3.01 -102891.1
Transportation Equipment 7.33 12.93 -0.03 1.23 -1.05 -14198.4
Machinery & Equipment 4.53 10.83 -3.04 1.58 -4.44 -99199.1
Other Manufactures 4.93 15.52 -0.51 1.21 -1.32 -70109.0
Elec., Gas & Water 6.33 -4.53 0.71 0.75 0.17 2982.9
Construction 15.90 2.99 0.63 0.72 0.14 20273.2
Trade and Transport 15.06 14.66 0.26 0.64 -0.07 -35549.3
Other Private Services 16.86 10.16 0.58 0.58 0.35 10009.5
Government Services 15.45 -2.91 1.22 0.86 0.81 340108.6
Average 9.22 8.30 0.50 0.00 0.0
Employment
Table 6
Sectoral Results of the Doha Development Round of Trade Negotiations
Percent Change in Exports, Imports, Output, Scale and Employment
India